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Abstract Psychiatric patients may try (or express a desire) to injure themselves in
hospital in order to cope with overwhelming emotional pain. Some health care
practitioners and patients propose allowing a controlled amount of self-injury to
occur in inpatient facilities, so as to prevent escalation of distress. Is this approach
an example of professional assistance with harm? Or, is the approach more likely to
minimise harm, by ensuring safer self-injury? In this article, I argue that health care
practitioners who use harm-minimisation can be considered to be helping physical
injury to occur, although they do not encourage the act. I consider why there are
compelling reasons to believe that a patient who self-injures is not maximally
autonomous in relation to that choice. However, I then move onto argue that
allowing a degree of self-injury may enable engagement with psychotherapy
(enhancing autonomy) and behavioural change. In these circumstances, allowing
injury (with precautions) may not be harm, all things considered.
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In this article, I discuss the morality of a psychiatric hospital management strategy
for self-injury that aims to reduce or limit, rather than stop, the behaviour. By
deﬁnition, health care practitioners who use the approach allow (a degree of) self-
injury to occur within an inpatient environment. To assess whether a practitioner
should use this approach, I examine the terms used to describe the strategy to
achieve a degree of conceptual clarity. I then consider whether allowing self-injury
is right or wrong.
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unpublished MA dissertation), ‘harm-minimisation’, or ‘assisted self-harm’ [1–3].
Unreﬂective adoption of any of these terms is problematic as they carry an implicit
evaluation of the method and, by extension, the practitioners involved in its
implementation. Safer self-harm and harm-minimisation are synonymous posi-
tively-evaluative phrases, implying the approach is good because it decreases the
probability or magnitude of a negative event.
1 In contrast, assisted self-harm implies
that those who use the approach help, in some way, a negative state of affairs to
obtain. In this article, I undertake a detailed analysis of this third phrase, ‘assisted
self-harm’, deﬁning and determining the signiﬁcance of its three constitutive terms
in relation to clinical staff and patient descriptions of self-injury.
The article is divided into four subsections. In the ﬁrst section, I explain what I
mean by the term ‘self-injury’ and consider whether assistance in injury can be
provided by an act or omission. I conclude that if the mental health care practitioner
provides the patient with the means for self-injury or otherwise fails to take steps to
prevent injury (e.g., by removing available means), then he or she contributes
relevantly to the outcome, assisting with the act by helping it to occur (even if he or
she does not encourage the act by initiating, maintaining, increasing, or promoting
the behaviour). In the second section, I consider whether providing assistance means
the practitioner is accountable for the outcome or whether the practitioner’s
responsibility can be abdicated if the individual who injures himself or herself
voluntarily undertakes the action, i.e., if the ‘self’ chooses the harm.
2 Through an
analysis of autonomy and self injury, I reach the conclusion that the choice to self-
injure may not be maximally voluntary,
3 but it also may not be completely non-
voluntary. If the choice to self-injure falls somewhere between the two extremes, the
practitioner who assists with the action and the patient who undertakes the action
both contribute relevantly to the occurrence of the consequent event, and as such,
they both bear a degree of responsibility for the outcome. In the third section, I
assess whether the practitioner is partially responsible for a behaviour that is
immoral. In doing so, I consider whether self-injury is necessarily harm and, if so,
whether such harm is bad. I conclude that allowing self-injury does not cause
relative harm (harm measured against an individual’s current ‘norm’, i.e., not harm
as subjectively determined by the individual). Self-injury nonetheless does maintain
the individual in a state of objective harm (a harmed-condition measurable
independent of the subject’s perceptions, conceptions, and current state). In the ﬁnal
section, I suggest that the health care practitioner has an obligation to remove the
individual from this harmed condition. This obligation entails the adoption of a
successful strategy to enact change. Paradoxically, removing an individual from a
harmed condition may depend on allowing self-injury to continue temporarily until
certain autonomy enhancing psychological conditions can be reached that enable
1 Harm is a ‘weak normative concept, carrying a presumption of evaluative negativity’ [4, p. 1034].
2 For a detailed discussion of voluntariness and body modiﬁcation in non-psychiatric cases, see [5].
3 An individual may not be able to control their own choices maximally until defects in reasoning or
information are remedied; see [6, pp. 196–213].
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intervention).
Assisting injury?
‘Self-injury’ is an umbrella term that can be used to describe many different
behaviours. According to the National Patient Safety Agency, self-injurious
behaviours encountered in an inpatient environment include self-cutting, burning,
poisoning, and strangulation (using a ligature) [7, p. 42].
4 Following from research
conducted by the Bristol Crisis Service for Women, in this article, the term ‘self-
injury’ will be used to describe injuring behaviours carried out to overcome
unpleasant affective mental states. These states include subjective feelings such as
overwhelming emotional pain, self-hatred, anger, anxiety, neediness, or unreality [8,
p. 13]. The injuring behaviours are used with the intention of helping the individual
cope with these distressing feelings and as such can be distinguished from other
self-injurious acts undertaken with suicidal intent or to cause a positively evaluated
physical alteration.
5
I will limit the current discussion of self-injuring behaviours to those which result
in a loss of bodily integrity and can relatively easily be subject to harm-
minimisation strategies, i.e., self-cutting and self-burning. In this context, a loss of
bodily integrity should be understood as an alteration to the body’s wholeness which
is likely to cause disﬁgurement (such as scarring) though not necessarily impairment
(diminished physiological function). It is important to consider self-cutting in
particular because it is the most common type of self-injurious behaviour [8, p. 6].
There are different ways in which a health care practitioner can be associated
with self-injury in an inpatient environment. I will focus my attention on two
scenarios in which self-injury might be permitted (subject to certain restrictions):
6
1. The care team provides the patient with a hospital-owned cutting implement on
request for private self-cutting.
2. The care team allows a patient, on request, to keep a self-acquired cutting
implement (e.g., glass) for private self-cutting.
In both circumstances the implement is sterilized to reduce the chance of infection.
It is established that the patient in question self-injures regularly (e.g., has visible
scarring) and knows how to dress wounds, and the patient is then provided with the
necessary materials to do so. To reduce the risk of impairment or accidental death,
the patient agrees to speak with the care team if the team has any concerns about the
severity of the injuries. The care team is aware of the early warning signs of the
4 This description is not intended to be exhaustive.
5 Cf. [5].
6 These scenarios have been chosen as examples of two approaches that have been suggested for practice.
The different approaches were described by participants in qualitative interviews that the author is
currently conducting with health care practitioners and patients.
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intervene if this occurs.
7
According to Schoene-Seifert [4, p. 1034], injury
8 is ‘ethically relevant only if it
occurs or persists in consequence to human agency, be it by action or omission,
from intention or negligence’.
9 What needs to be determined in this article is (1)
whether the practitioners’ behaviour (action/omission) is a means to the consequent
injury (are they agents who are relevantly related to the outcome) and (2) whether
their behaviour is undertaken because the practitioner is striving towards an
appropriate goal (rather than acting carelessly or recklessly). In this section, I
address these points by considering whether the care team is assisting the patient in
either or both of the scenarios. (At this juncture I will not consider the role of the
patient in the sequence of events.
10)
Helpful examples of the different types of assistance that may exist can be found
in criminal law; e.g., ‘a person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide of
another’ [10] essentially assists in that act. These terms mean, respectively, that
individuals are judged to provide assistance if they help, advise, encourage, or bring
about an event (even though another commits the last act).
11 I will use these criteria
as a list of alternative meanings for the term ‘assistance’ against which the scenarios
can be assessed. I will start by examining whether the health care practitioners help
obtain a state of affairs (or bring it about). I will then discuss whether they
encourage the patient to undertake the act. Although it is an interesting question, for
brevity, I will leave aside analysis of the relevance of advice.
12
In each scenario, do the practitioners help self-injury to occur or persist? All
things being equal, the distinction between scenario 1 and 2 is between doing
(action) and allowing (inaction or omission).
13 In scenario 1, the health care
practitioner is active in relation to the harm (by providing the means), and in
scenario 2, the practitioner is passive (by letting the patient perform the action,
using an implement they already possess, without intervention) [12, p. 9]. It
7 These conditions are the author’s interpretation of a harm-minimisation care plan for self-injury used
within the Sexual Abuse Service, South Staffordshire and Shropshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust.
8 For consistency I have substituted the word harm with the word injury.
9 Negligence can mean ‘(1) intentionally imposing unreasonable risks of harm (advertent negligence or
recklessness) and (2) unintentionally but carelessly imposing risks of harm (inadvertent negligence)’ [9,
p. 154].
10 I will pick up this question in the next section.
11 My understanding of the different concepts of ‘assistance’ is based on common usage rather than legal
interpretation. The arguments advanced hold regardless of whether these deﬁnitions follow legal
developments.
12 As a point of interest, NICE guidelines on self-harm suggest that it is appropriate for a practitioner to
‘discuss harm minimisation issues and techniques’ when an individual is likely to repeat self-injury, but
the guidelines are silent on the appropriateness of allowing self-injury to occur in health care facilities
[11].
13 I will assume for current purposes that the provision of the implement by the team does not provide
any additional opportunity for dialogue between the team and the service user which might affect their
drive to self-injure.
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14 whether, ‘in certain contexts, failure to perform
an act, with certain foreseen consequences of that failure, is morally less bad than to
perform a different act which has identical foreseen consequences’ [14, p. 92]. In
this article I am interested in whether both scenarios help an event to occur (i.e.,
bringing the event about). This latter question can be determined while leaving aside
the additional question of whether helping by action or inaction is worse.
A relevant question when considering whether or not help occurs is whether the
health care practitioner causes the injury, as causation and responsibility are linked.
Put another way, an appreciation of an agent’s role in the chain of events leading to
injury is necessary before one can assess whether it is reasonable to hold the agent
accountable for the outcome. Scenario 1, in which the health care practitioner acts,
is a relatively unproblematic example of an agent causing the outcome.
15 The
provision of a hospital-owned cutting implement is an act that leads to an injury. It
is more controversial whether scenario 2 describes a causal sequence, so the
following discussion will focus on this scenario, drawing on McGrath’s review of
causation by omission.
According to McGrath there is a question of whether omissions are causes: either
there is no causation by omission or there is far more than common sense suggests
[15, p. 126]. Arguments for the ﬁrst possibility are as follows: there is no causation
by omission because causal relata are events (and omissions are not events), or
because cause and effect involves a physical connection (such as a transfer of
energy) which is missing when an individual fails to act [15, p. 127]. These
objections to omissions as causes focus exclusively on cause as a natural
phenomena (cause and effect). However, there are different causal idioms that
link conduct to subsequent events, e.g., cause and effect, cause and consequence,
and cause and result [16, p. 172]. According to Feinberg, it is more natural to accept
that omissions have consequences rather than effects [16, p. 173].
If one focuses on the relationship between cause and consequence, for an
omission to be a cause, it is necessary to accept the following counterfactual
proposal: an omission causes an event if and only if the event occurs when the
omission obtains, and the event does not occur when a counterfactual act obtains
(the counterfactual act prevents the event) [15, p. 132]. In the self-injury example a
counterfactual act, such as removing the cutting implement, would prevent the
particular injury in question from occurring.
16 Unfortunately, this explanation does
not provide necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for omissions as causes because
there are many counterfactual actions that could prevent the event. The question
remains how one determines that the particular omission is the cause; why failure of
the speciﬁc agent to perform the speciﬁc preventative act is relevant.
Jonathan Bennett and David Lewis accept that omissions can be causes and, to
avoid over-extension (the second possibility in McGrath’s dilemma), that relevant
14 E.g., [13].
15 If one assumes at this juncture that the service user’s action does not break the chain of causation.
16 One could argue that there is still a probability that injury can occur by other means and that the
likelihood of injury may in fact increase (e.g., because of increased distress), but these empirical facts are
not relevant to the particular point being made.
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out as notably signiﬁcant’) [17, p. 133; 18, p. 196]. McGrath suggests that normative
conditions should be added to determine signiﬁcance. She proposes that relevance is
measured by what is normal, what an agent is supposed to do in a given situation: an
agent relevantly causes an outcome if he or she omits to undertake an action that is
its ‘normal would be preventer’ according to some standard determined by the
actual situation [15, pp. 136–141]. In Feinberg’s terms, an omission is a relevant
cause of the consequence if the agent was required to act (e.g., because of a moral
obligation or a special duty in virtue of his or her profession), was in a position to
act, and did not.
This understanding of relevant causes can be used to assess whether the mental
health care practitioners help with the patient’s self-injury. I propose that their
omission is a salient cause, because the health care practitioner has a duty of care in
relation to the patient, and the practitioner’s inaction leads to a signiﬁcant event not
being prevented. The event is signiﬁcant because the practitioner purposefully
decides to provide an opportunity for injury by failing to undertake common
precautions, such as removal of sharp objects and observation. The normative
conditions extend the assessment from a consideration of whether the practitioner
helped, to whether the practitioner should have helped, assessing moral culpability
for the omission as well as causal responsibility. This assessment can be addressed
more successfully, in the given context, within the analysis of harm.
Once one accepts that the health care practitioner’s omission is a causal factor in
the consequent injury, and this means they help the event obtain (bringing it about),
a question remains of whether they encourage the injury. To encourage the act, the
practitioner needs to stimulate or spur the patient onto self-injury. I propose that
encouragement needs to be measured against the explicit intentions of the
practitioners when they allow self-injury to occur. Practitioners who advocate the
use of the approach defend the strategy as a means to prevent escalation of injury,
and, rather than simply allowing any injury, they suggest potential distraction
techniques to avoid injury and promote safer injuring techniques.
17 These facts
strongly suggest that the intention is neither to increase the incidence or degree of
injury nor to maintain the injury beyond the time that it helps a patient to cope with
distress. The aim that guides the (in)action is injury reduction rather than
stimulation. If a practitioner acted in a way that encouraged injury, one can assume
that the behaviour was reckless or careless in relation to the injury. A possible
objection to my position is that help of itself provides tacit encouragement for the
action. My response is that it is logically possible to help an event obtain while
simultaneously holding a desire that said event not eventuate. The health care
practitioner can communicate to the patient this desire that the injury not occur and
that the patient’s behaviour is tolerated as a temporary coping strategy.
In conclusion, the practitioner assists in the self-injury, but this assistance is
limited to helping someone undertake the behaviour, and does not include providing
17 Determined at interview with practitioners (unpublished) and explicitly stated in [19].
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18
An omission as well as an act can help injury to occur if the causal idiom being used
is cause and consequence, not cause and effect. Although the health care
practitioner is an agent who stands in a relevant relationship to the injury, the
patient also plays a signiﬁcant role in the injury’s occurrence—the patient is
considering self-injury. Bearing this in mind, I will now address the patient’s role
and its relevance to the practitioner’s accountability.
Self-chosen injury?
In the previous section, I temporarily put aside the relevance of the patient
personally undertaking the ﬁnal act—the self causing the injury. In this part of the
article, I will address whether the patient voluntarily chooses to injure himself or
herself and, if so, whether this means that the patient is sufﬁciently accountable that
no responsibility need be attributed to the practitioner. According to Feinberg,
voluntariness makes a difference to whether an action is judged to be wrong: ‘One
class of harms (in the sense of set-back interests) must certainly be excluded from
those that are properly called wrongs… These include harms voluntarily inﬂicted by
the actor upon himself’ [16, p. 35]. I will now assess whether the patient’s self-
injuring actions are voluntary, i.e., whether the injury is a consequence of his or her
volition (i.e., whether it is self-determined).
One of the conditions used to determine whether an individual is acting freely is
the possession of certain mental capacities, such as the ability to act on the basis of
one’s own, self-chosen, desires or plans; that is, having ‘the capacity for intentional
action’ [9, p. 100]. According to O’Neill, accounts of individual autonomy can be
viewed as descriptions of the personal traits, capacities, or competencies necessary
for successful functioning, i.e., of psychological abilities which individuals need (to
a modest
19 degree) to ensure that they have the resolve and self-conﬁdence to fulﬁl
their obligations [20, p. 96]. These psychological abilities and their relevance for
self-injury can be explored via an analysis of available accounts of procedural and
substantive autonomy.
Procedural accounts can be divided into endorsement and historical accounts [21,
p. 13]. Frankfurt’s writing on freedom of the will is recognised as a fundamental
endorsement account.
20,21 Frankfurt posits that people can form second order
desires about their ﬁrst order desires, where a ﬁrst order desire is a desire to act and
a second order desire is an evaluation of the ﬁrst order desire (e.g., people can want
to want an action) [24, pp. 64–66]. Frankfurt distinguishes between second order
desires and second order volitions, which are second order desires that a person
18 This does not entail inferring that encouragement goes beyond assistance but only that assistance can
be provided with or without encouragement.
19 Intuitively, I disagree with O’Neill’s assertion that these abilities are only needed to a ‘modest’ degree.
20 This is in spite of the fact that the account was originally intended to be a conceptualisation of the
necessary features for a person. For discussion of Frankfurt in relation to autonomy, see [22, pp. 6–7].
21 First order and second order endorsement conditions are also evident in [23, p. 20].
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second order desires will prevent second order volitions, which ‘removes [a person]
from his will so that his will operates without his participation’ [24, p. 71]. This
destruction of the authentic will is pertinent for an examination of self-harm. If it
can be shown that individuals who self-harm are not acting on a second order
volition, then it could indicate that they are not acting (maximally) voluntarily in
their self-harming actions. For example, the person who self-injures may
simultaneously want to want to injure because of self-hatred, and wish not to
want to injure, realising it is only a transiently effective solution for emotional pain.
There are objections associated with relying solely on an endorsement account to
determine procedural failures in an individual’s motivational structure.
22 According
to many authors, a hierarchical, critically reﬂective desire structure encounters an
unavoidable problem of regress [21, p. 13]. Although some maintain that an inﬁnite
regress is circumvented because of the natural limitations of the human mind [23,p .
19], it is difﬁcult to establish a deﬁnitive example of an action that demonstrates an
unavoidably authentic desire structure. It might be accepted that the problem of
regress does not fatally undermine the application of endorsement accounts if the
aim is to establish cases where unresolved conﬂict reveals an inauthentic desire.
However, it can be questioned whether an endorsement account is sufﬁcient for this
purpose because the account has also been charged with a (possibly intractable)
problem of perfectionism. Endorsement may set too high a standard for autonomy if
the account rules out the possibility of having an autonomous desire of which one
doesn’t approve [25, p. 113]. Perhaps ‘we need a ﬁne[r]-grained account of the
kinds of inconsistencies among desires that can plausibly be said to be autonomy
undermining’ [26, p. 104].
Another approach for procedural accounts is to establish historical criteria for
autonomous desires.
23 Christman distinguishes his historical criterion from
hierarchical structures by claiming that the key feature of autonomous desire
formation is that the agent ‘did not resist the development of D [desire] when
attending to this process of development, or P [the person] would not have resisted
that development had P attended to the process’ [27, p. 347]. So, on this account, a
desire is autonomous if it is chosen by the person on reﬂection without actual or
counterfactual resistance. In relation to self-injury, the desire to injure would be
judged to be autonomous if the individual would not have resisted the development
of the desire to injure if he or she had attended to the process of the formation of the
desire. The desire to self-injure is often formed as a reaction to abuse or neglect [8,
p. 3]. One can postulate that a behaviour motivated by these events may be resisted
on reﬂection.
Like endorsement accounts, historical accounts are also subject to objections. An
objection that is levelled against both accounts is that they do not address the effects
of oppressive socialisation on the development of desires [21, p. 13]. All accounts
22 These objections hold in addition to any potential objections that could be posited based on the
difﬁculty of assessing people’s inner worlds via their accounts of action or observed behaviour.
23 According to [21], Dworkin also adds an historical dimension to his endorsement account by stating
that autonomous agents can reﬂect on the acquisition of their desires and ‘attempt to change these in the
light of higher order preferences or values’.
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accounts, position the judgments within the social and physical forces of nature, and
as such, all reﬂective capacities used by a procedurally autonomous person may
have been subject to oppressive social forces. It is open to debate whether these
forces necessarily undermine autonomy or whether one can successfully step back
and reﬂect on the social forces which inform one’s development.
24
If one accepts that, in spite of certain limitations, procedural accounts outline
necessary features of individual autonomy, perhaps through the use of a principle of
charity,
25 the question remains whether these features are sufﬁcient to judge whether
an action is autonomous. With respect to the question at hand, do these features
describe all the relevant psychological characteristics that can be used to determine
whether an individual who self-injures is acting voluntarily? If one turns to
substantive accounts of autonomy, it is apparent that procedural accounts may not
be sufﬁcient for this purpose.
One aspect of individual psychology that procedural accounts neglect is the non-
cognitive, those affective qualities that can be autonomy enhancing or undermining.
One relevant substantive account of autonomy which addresses affect is provided by
Benson in his examination of free agency and self-worth [29]. On this account, ‘free
agents must have a certain sense of their own worthiness to act, or of their status as
agents, which is not guaranteed by their abilities to act freely by reﬂectively
authorizing their wills and their action’ [29, p. 650]. If individuals cease to trust
themselves to govern their actions competently (e.g., as the result of psychiatric
diagnoses that estrange them from their former sense of themselves as worthwhile
agents or because of persistent self-critical mental states), then their ability to act
autonomously can be affected [29, p. 657]. Benson’s theory is substantive because it
claims that ‘holding certain attitudes, would preclude the necessary sense of worth
(psychologically, if not logically)’ [29, p. 664].
If this substantive account is used to supplement the procedural accounts, then
agents need to meet criteria for endorsement, have freely-formed desires relative to
the self-injuring action, and feel a sufﬁcient degree of self-worth to be judged to
possess enough individual autonomy to act voluntarily. The self-worth condition
may be criticised as unnecessary by those who believe that insufﬁcient self-worth
undermines the ability to undertake cognitive reﬂection; however, it is logically
possible that the cognitive abilities of an individual remain unchanged even if the
individual mistrusts these abilities.
The intended self-injury of an individual who has failed to meet certain
thresholds of endorsement, free-formation of desires, and self-worth may be
‘substantially non-voluntary’ [30, p. 8]. This is not to say that the choice is ‘near the
bottom of the scale of voluntariness’ [30, p. 8], but just that it is possible for the
choice to be more voluntary. Given this eventuality it seems that it would be
inappropriate for the patient to be held fully responsible for the injury (even if they
reach certain procedural standards such as legal capacity). However, if the patient’s
24 See [28].
25 A principle of charity, suggested in [27, p. 350], is an acknowledgement that an account is the best,
strongest, possible explanation given our current understanding (in spite of its limitations).
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both the practitioner and patient cause the injury to some degree. This means they
can both be held partially responsible for the outcome. The question remains
whether they are both responsible for harm.
Is injury harm?
It is uncontroversial to state that the outcome of the management strategy under
consideration is physical injury, which is what is intended
26 by both parties and
desired by the patient. The important consideration is whether allowing injury is
necessarily an example of allowing harm. An important distinction can be made
between proximate injury and harm—on a narrow conception of injury, a body-
altering injury (physical damage) may not count as harm, all things considered [31,
p. 279].
Feinberg speciﬁes that harm should be conceived as ‘the thwarting, setting back,
or defeating of an interest’ that is also a wrong [16, pp. 33–36]. An interest is
deﬁned as something one has a stake in, a component of one’s well-being, and a
wrong occurs when ‘a person’s indefensible (unjustiﬁable and inexcusable) conduct
violates another’s right’ [16, p. 35]. Alternatively, the word harm can be used to
indicate doing someone wrong, in the sense of violating someone’s rights or having
an adverse effect on his or her interests [9, p. 152]. For present purposes, I accept the
latter distinction and put aside the question of rights, focusing instead on how self-
injury relates to a person’s interests. This approach means that a practitioner can be
seen as having a prima facie, rather than an absolute, obligation not to harm others
or impose indefensible risks of harm [9, p. 153].
According to Schoene-Seifert, there is ‘an asymmetry between harm and beneﬁt
in the sense that harm pertains exclusively to the basics of well-being’ [4, p. 1034].
Feinberg calls these basics the welfare interests, claiming that they are ‘minimal but
nonultimate goods’ that are necessary as a means to achieving one’s ulterior
interests [16, p. 37]. The speciﬁc welfare interests are contestable, but perhaps few
would argue that there are interests in an absence of physical suffering or
malfunction and emotional suffering or dysfunction.
27 Feinberg includes the
following relevant interests amongst the welfare interests: the integrity and normal
functioning of one’s body; the absence of absorbing pain and suffering or grotesque
disﬁgurement; emotional stability; and a certain amount of freedom from
interference and coercion [16, p. 37].
Feinberg, following Rescher, states that there are few if any trade-offs operative
between interests as they ‘make a chain no stronger than the weakest link’ [16,p .
37]. However, he concedes that some individuals will undertake ‘protective
diversiﬁcation’ whereby they arrange their interests ‘so that what harms some of
26 In relation to the practitioner’s intentions, I accept that it is open to debate whether they intend or
merely foresee the outcome. In the particular circumstances under consideration the practitioner knows
the injury is virtually certain to occur and accepts that allowing the injury serves a purpose that is
(temporarily) valuable (as assessed by the patient).
27 See Schramme in this special issue for an analysis of mental disorder as dysfunction.
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certain level, even at the cost of an equally strong expectation that they will not
substantially rise above that level either’ [16, p. 41]. The problem with this
arrangement is that in protecting the interests from falling below a certain level, the
individual is necessarily damaging part of the chain, making it difﬁcult to advance
his or her net interests sufﬁciently to realise ulterior interests. As such, protective
diversiﬁcation may prevent incapacitating suffering, but it is not a sufﬁcient
condition for well-being [16, p. 41]. As I described earlier, some patients who self-
injure cause physical disﬁgurement (and pain) to help them cope with severe
emotional suffering. This can be viewed as an example of protective diversiﬁcation.
If one assumes that these welfare interests are commensurable, protective
diversiﬁcation may not cause a net reduction in welfare, although it does prevent
welfare advancement. So is the prevention of welfare enhancement harm? Harm can
be viewed as a relative concept: ‘whether one is harmed by an event is determined
by reference to where he was before, and whether his position has improved or
regressed’ [16, p. 54]. Once harm is understood in this way, and if harm-
minimisation strategies can successfully prevent injuries that cause impairment of
function, allowing self-injury does not appear to cause relative harm. Moreover, if
the individual is already disﬁgured (already has scarring) it is possible that this
interest is only affected to a slight degree, while the emotional stability interest is
signiﬁcantly enhanced (albeit temporarily).
28
However, there is another non-relative understanding of harm, according to
which an individual can be judged against objective criteria as being in a harmed
condition. On this view, the baseline against which people are judged is what is
‘normal’ for ﬂourishing agents rather than for the speciﬁc individual. If one
considers the effects of self-injuring on advancement of interests it is possible that
the individual, even absent relative harm, remains at a level of welfare too low to
successfully achieve ulterior interests. This is supported by the probability that
while self-injuring offers a temporary relief from emotional pain, it neither
addresses the reasons for emotional vulnerability nor provides an opportunity for
emotional repair. Consequently, if the individual continues indeﬁnitely to use self-
injury as the only means of coping, the individual may never reach a ‘normal’ level
of welfare. If this is the case, the ﬁnal remaining question is whether allowing an
activity that does not produce a relative harm but does leave an individual in a
harmed condition is ever justiﬁable.
Enhancing the self to prevent harm
Health care practitioners have a prima facie obligation to remove the self-injuring
individual from a harmed condition to improve their welfare. What needs to be
established is whether prohibition of self-injury or allowing injury is the best means
to remove an individual from a harmed condition. Effective behavioural change, in
part, involves helping the individual to develop their psychological capacities. As
28 One act of self-injury relieves but does not end emotional suffering.
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reﬂect on his or her beliefs, challenge any inconsistencies, and develop self-worth.
Different authors have linked the development of judgment and self-worth to being
afforded the freedom to act. According to Feinberg, ‘If adults are treated
[paternalistically with the state in loco parentis] they will in time come to be like
children. Deprived of the right to choose for themselves, they will lose the power of
rational judgment and decision. Even children, after a certain point, had better not
be ‘treated as children,’ else they will never acquire the outlook and capability of
responsible adults’ [32, p. 24]. And in the words of Dworkin, ‘our self esteem and
sense of worth are bound up with the right to determine what shall be done to and
with our bodies and minds’ [23, p. 95]. It appears that prohibition of self-injury does
not, in and of itself, assist the individual to develop the capacity to choose
reasonably and with conﬁdence.
Some may object that ﬁrm prohibitive boundaries are a necessary preliminary
measure before persuasion can be used to effect change, i.e., that stopping self-
injury is a necessary pre-condition for effective therapy. In response to this, I
suggest that to accept boundaries without resistance, an individual may need to be at
an advanced stage of psychological recovery.
29 Practitioners and patients report that
prohibiting self-injury in inpatients can create an escalation of distress and can lead
the patient to disengage from any psychotherapeutic intervention or to experience a
disintegration of relations with their health care team [Chris Holley, personal
communication]. If these claims are correct, then prohibition may prevent the
necessary conditions for change from being achieved. Instead, respecting the
patient’s choice might offer a better opportunity for therapeutic dialogue to develop
or evolve and, in turn, for alternative coping strategies to be explored. If so,
allowing a (degree of) self-injury is a temporary measure that ultimately removes
the patient from a harmed condition by providing an opportunity for the
development of sufﬁcient autonomy to protect physical and emotional interests.
Conclusion and future considerations
If the proposed conceptual understanding of assisted self-injury and the empirical
claims about behavioural change are accepted, one can conclude that health care
practitioners are justiﬁed in allowing self-injury if they ensure relative harm does
not occur and they work towards enhancing the patient’s capacity to undertake
voluntary choices. It can be predicted that with psychological recovery the desire to
self-injure will diminish and, as such, objective harm will be reduced. Given these
claims allowing proximate injury may not lead to harm, all things considered. Injury
is permitted in the short-term to enable the patient to develop the capacities
necessary for long-term advancement of interests. Although practitioners help to
bring about a degree of injury, they do not encourage the event but suggest ways to
minimise the degree of physical damage. As such, they assist with a patient’s safer
self-injury.
29 This may be precluded by the fact that the person is sufﬁciently unwell to merit hospitalisation.
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In the approach described in this article, injury is tolerated as a temporary means to
engagement and therapeutic change. This does not mean that the practitioner is
endorsing self-injury as an uncontroversial choice. When a practitioner begins
psychotherapy with the patient, it is important that this fact is explicitly addressed.
This is relevant because it is likely that psychological recovery rests in part on the
patient developing an understanding that non-neglectful and non-abusive relation-
ships require respect for another person’s mind and body. It is important that the
health care practitioner’s temporary acceptance of injury, until other coping
strategies are developed, is not interpreted by the patient as contradictory to this
therapeutic aim.
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